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 at Munitions Sites
Unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) frequently result in contamination and destruction 
similar to that resulting from conflict. Preventive measures can reduce the risk of UEMS and are sig-
nificantly easier to deploy than clearance after an explosion.
by Chris Loughran and Daan Redelinghuys [ MAG ]
International concern over un-planned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) has grown consid-
erably in recent years. UEMS have gar-
nered significant media attention as a 
result of the large number of civilians 
killed or injured by these explosions. 
Efforts by states, the U.N., internation-
al and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO), and research institutes have 
focused on the scale and nature of the 
problem while developing initiatives to 
prevent unplanned explosions.
Tragically, unplanned explosions of-
ten occur in populated areas. For exam-
ple, fire at a munitions site in northern 
Lagos, Nigeria, caused an explosion in 
2002, killing more than 1,000 civilians.1 
In July 2011, a similar munitions explo-
sion destroyed the largest power plant 
in Cyprus.1 In 2012, the series of explo-
sions that occurred at a military site in 
the center of Brazzaville, Republic of the 
Congo (ROC), was one of the largest in-
cidents in recent years. Immediately fol-
lowing the explosion, global attention 
focused on the enormous human and 
economic impact of UEMS.1
The Small Arms Survey found 302 
instances of unplanned explosions in 
76 countries between January 1998 and 
October 2011.2 As a result of such explo-
sions, communities are rendered home-
less, and rescue workers fight fires and 
find survivors and bodies in the rubble 
of collapsed buildings, all shown on in-
ternational media and the Internet.
Consequences of UEMS
Recognition is growing of the long-
term social and economic consequences 
of UEMS, which are typically less vis-
ible but extend far beyond the imme-
Munitions stored at this tank regiment barracks in Brazzaville, ROC, exploded on  
4 March 2012, killing 223 people and injuring 2,500.
Photo courtesy of Laudes Martial Mbon/IRIN.
diate loss of life and the financial costs 
associated with emergency response. 
The closure of industrial sites, business-
es and trading centers has long-term 
consequences for business owners and 
employees. Hospitals, schools and mu-
nicipal facilities in the blast radius may 
remain closed for weeks or even years. 
Government budgets invariably need to 
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reprioritize significant costs of reconstruction over multiple 
years. For example, the Brazzaville explosion destroyed hun-
dreds of homes and businesses, leading to the temporary clo-
sure of schools and a hospital. An estimated 5,000 people lost 
their homes.
From a mine action perspective, emergency response op-
erations need to incorporate explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) support to enable safe access for emergency respond-
ers while also systematically identifying and destroying 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). UXO can be projected a con-
siderable distance from the explosion site and are often highly 
unstable. In most cases, reporting systems and risk educa-
tion in communities that have not previously experienced the 
risks associated with contamination from UXO must accom-
pany EOD operations. 
For the international mine action community, UEMS 
occurring in countries with a limited EOD or mine action-
coordination capacity can trigger emergency response deploy-
ments and operations usually associated with a post-conflict 
environment. In many respects, the effect of an unplanned 
explosion is similar to the impact of conflict, including long-
lasting, extensive damage to infrastructure. 
Preventive Measures
While the availability of expert clearance, risk education 
and coordination support after an incident is important, de-
voting the same technical expertise and resources to prevent or 
reduce the risk of such incidents is preferable. Purely in terms 
of operational costs, post-explosion clearance is vastly more 
expensive than preventive measures to improve weapons and 
ammunition management and destroy surplus munitions. 
The management of stockpiles is a broad and detailed sub-
ject, but the key principles relevant to the causes of UEMS 
(including the escalation of a single explosive event to a cata-
strophic disaster like that seen in Brazzaville) are not complex. 
Munitions do not have an indefinite shelf life; they degrade 
over time, and storage conditions significantly impact their 
expected lifespan. Physical factors such as temperature, hu-
midity and rough handling affect shelf life, making explosives 
unstable and at greater risk of not functioning as intended. 
While munitions are designed for continual maintenance 
throughout their life cycles in ways that maximize shelf life, 
they also have safety parameters that minimize the effect of an 
explosive incident. Key safety factors include protection against 
fire and static electricity (including lightning) as well as stor-
Brazzaville residents camp out on the grounds of a cathedral after they were displaced by a huge explosion at an army bar-
racks in the city.
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age in “compatibility groups,” with in-
compatible items (due to their chemical 
composition or explosive effect) stored 
separately within a storage site.
Safety measures include what is con-
sidered a safe distance for civilians rel-
ative to storage locations. These limits 
reduce the risk of a single explosive in-
cident propagating through the storage 
area and initiating further explosions 
that result in large-scale incidents. Fre-
quently, controls over construction and 
development in close proximity to mu-
nitions sites are not implemented, and 
urbanization dangerously encroaches 
on depots. This should require a reduc-
tion in facilities’ storage quantity or the 
relocation of facilities to a new site. In 
many cases, particularly in countries 
with poor infrastructure, capacity and 
resources, these essential safety mea-
sures are not carried out.
UEMS causes range from mechani-
cal or chemical deterioration of compo-
nents to internal or external events such 
as fire and lightning, and include hu-
man factors such as improper handling 
or tampering. These causes often result 
from inadequate site security. Poor stor-
age practices of temporary or perma-
nent stockpiles may result in an initial 
explosion leading to multiple explo-
sions, as was seen in the Brazzaville in-
cident. Reducing UEMS risk therefore 
requires steps to improve the condi-
tions under which munitions are stored 
and how munitions are managed. This 
also involves the routine destruction of 
obsolete or degraded munitions. 
Many states have developed de-
tailed standards and procedures to en-
sure the safe storage and management 
of military-held munitions. Since their 
launch in 2011, the International Am-
munition Technical Guidelines (IATG) 
have provided a normative framework 
to improve munitions management.3 
IATGs also offer solutions to prevent 
UEMS and diversion of munitions 
from state stocks.
For many states, implementing and 
managing even the most basic im-
provements necessary to address the 
immediate causes of UEMS still face 
significant challenges, including bud-
get constraints and competing priori-
ties for limited government resources. 
This is particularly true for countries 
with poor infrastructure and a lack of 
technical expertise in munitions man-
agement. Theft presents an additional 
challenge for countries emerging from 
protracted conflict.4 
Technical Assistance
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) pro-
vides a range of technical assistance to 
states, including Burundi, Libya, ROC, 
and South Sudan, seeking to prevent 
UEMS. Assistance typically takes the 
form of storage-facility assessments and 
training-needs assessments for muni-
tions-storage managers and supervising 
officers. Assessments also identify sur-
plus and obsolete stocks, inform sub-
sequent training programs and lead to 
the relocation or physical rehabilita-
tion of facilities. National buy-in for the 
program is essential, as is local capacity 
building. 
Even in the most complex operating 
environments, states can implement in-
expensive, effective steps, such as evalu-
ating munitions storage procedures and 
reorganizing munitions within the stor-
age facilities, to improve the safety of 
their facilities and to gain long-term 
commitment from donors and greater 
political support. A small degree of in-
tervention can tangibly address the 
causes of UEMS and assure security of 
state stocks over time. Although initial 
preventive measures may require exter-
nal technical assistance and donor sup-
port, initiatives to prevent UEMS under 
the broad framework of IATGs can only 
be truly sustainable and effective in the 
long term if they are nationally owned 
and led. 
Extensive damage was caused to residential areas of Brazzaville when munitions 
at an army barracks blew up.
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